publications

2022

1. Tools, experiments, and theories: An examination of the role of experiment tools

   Johnson, Gregory

   in Bickle, Craver, & Barwich (eds.) The Tools of Neuroscience Experiment

   Abs

   Theory has a central place in the traditional accounts of scientific practice. It’s less clear, however, what role theory has, and should have, in contemporary neuroscience. John Bickle argues that we should appreciate the central role that the development and use of experiment tools have in neuroscientific practice and the notable lack of an apparent need for theory. Call this the tools first method. I use two cases to assess Bickle’s assertion that the tools first method is always used in neuroscience. In the first—the use of gene targeting to investigate the relationship between memory and long-term potentiation—a well-defined theory did have a prominent role. In contrast, the second case, an optogenetic investigation of neurons in the extended amygdala, illustrates the application of Bickle’s tools first method.
   The takeaway, then, is twofold. Although sometimes theory has a role, there are productive investigations in neurobiology that proceed without a theory as the starting point. This is, in part, a consequence of experiment tools that allow for ever more precise investigations of cellular and molecular processes. It is also a consequence of the explanatory goals in neurobiology, namely, the description of mechanisms. When these two consequences come together, there is no longer an apparent need for theories of the sort traditionally taken to be central to scientific practice.

2019

1. Mont Rev

   What Is Ethics Anyway?

   Johnson, Gregory

   The Montreal Review

   Website

2016

1. Argument and Inference: An Introduction to Inductive Logic

   Johnson, Gregory

   Abs Website

   A thorough and practical introduction to inductive logic with a focus on arguments and the rules used for making inductive inferences.

2. PP

   Methodological Functionalism and the Description of Natural Systems

   Johnson, Gregory

   Philosophical Psychology

   Abs

   The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs (i.e., stimuli from the environment) are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s (1684) explanation of fermentation, Farr’s (mid-1800s) explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s (mid-1800s) explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. This technique has limitations. The implications for cognitive psychology are considered, and one conclusion is that cognitive psychology will eventually cease relying on methodological functionalism.

2012

1. EJPS

   The relationship between psychological capacities and neurobiological activities

   Johnson, Gregory

   European Journal for Philosophy of Science

   Abs PDF

   This paper addresses the relationship between psychological capacities, as they are understood within cognitive psychology, and neurobiological activities. First, Lycan’s (1987) account of this relationship is examined and certain problems with his account are explained. According to Lycan, psychological capacities occupy a higher level than neurobiological activities in a hierarchy of levels of nature, and psychological entities can be decomposed into neurobiological entities. After discussing some problems with Lycan’s account, a similar, more recent account built around levels of mechanisms is examined (Craver 2007). In the second half of this paper, an alternative is laid out. This new account uses levels of organization and levels of explanation to create a two-dimensional model. Psychological capacities occupy a high level of explanation relative to the cellular and molecular levels of organization. As a result, according to this model, psychological capacities are a particular way of describing the activities that occur at the cellular and molecular levels of organization.

2009

1. M&M

   Mechanisms and Functional Brain Areas

   Johnson, Gregory

   Minds and Machines

   Abs Website

   Abstract Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas participate in mechanisms, then they must engage in activities. A number of ways in which we might understand the claim that functional brain areas engage in activities are examined. None are successful, and so one conclusion is that functional brain areas do not participate in mechanisms. Consequently, they are not the entities that carry out psychological capacities.

2. IEP

   Theories of Emotion

   Johnson, Gregory

   Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   Website

2008

1. PP

   LeDoux’s Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process

   Johnson, Gregory

   Philosophical Psychology

   Abs Website

   LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.